

Message Text

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62

ORIGIN EUR-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 RSC-01 /008 R

66612

DRAFTED BY:EUR/EE:HGILMORE

12/5/73 EXT 22140

APPROVED BY:EUR/EE:JABAKER

----- 044309

O R 052229Z DEC 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 238341

FOLLOWING REPEAT GENEVA 6361 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALL CSCE
CAPITALS, LISBON, NICOSIA, OSLO, SOFIA, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR,
USDOCOSOUTH, AND USLOSACLANT DATED 3 DEC 1973:

QTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 6361

VIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE: AN OVERVIEW

1. SUMMARY: THE APPROACHING CHRISTMAS RECESS WILL MARK
THE TRANSITION BETWEEN THE DEBATING AND DRAFTING STAGES
OF CSCE. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE DRAFTING STAGE, WHEN
IT BEGINS IN JANUARY, WILL REQUIRE TWO OR THREE MONTHS
AND THAT A REASONABLY ACCEPTABLE FINAL DOCUMENT CAN BE
AGREED IN TIME FOR A FINAL STAGE, TO BE ATTENDED AT AN
AS YET UNDERTIMED LEVEL, IN HELSINKI IN JUNE OR JULY.
THIS IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF MESSAGES WHICH WILL
REVIEW THE PROGRESS OF CSCE TO DATE, IDENTIFY THE CENTRAL
ISSUES, AND DRAW IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. POSITION DURING
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THE DECISIVE STAGE WHICH LIES AHEAD. THIS MESSAGE

ADDRESSES OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS; THE FOUR WHICH FOLLOW WILL ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT AREAS OF THE CONFERENCE. TAKEN TOGETHER, THEY ARE INTENDED TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR THE DELEGATION'S CONSULTATIONS OVER THE CHRISTMAS RECESS. END SUMMARY.

2. CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES. THE PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE SO FAR HAS TURNED ESSENTIALLY ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN OBJECTIVES. MOSCOW'S LONG-STANDING AIMS FOR CSCE HAVE BEEN TO ACHIEVE THE MULTILATERAL RATIFICATION OF THE POSTWAR DIVISION OF EUROPE IN A DOCUMENT SIGNED IN A TRIUMPHANT CONFERENCE FINALE BY 35 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, AND TO INSTITUTIONALIZE A CONTINUING SOVIET VOICE IN ALL-EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF FOLLOW-ON POLITICAL MACHINERY. THE WEST HAS SOUGHT TO CONTAIN THE FIRST OF THESE OBJECTIVES IN LANGUAGE WHICH WILL PERMIT PEACEFUL BORDER CHANGES IN THE FUTURE (HAVING IN MIND, ABOVE ALL, THE POSSIBILITY OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION) AND WHICH WILL UNDERCUT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, AND TO ACHIEVE A MEASURE OF FREER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AS THE PRICE TO BE PAID BY THE SOVIETS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE. THIS CONFLICT HAS LEAD TO INTRICATE PROCEDURAL MANEUVERING IN WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE RESISTED PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF INTEREST TO THE OTHER UNTIL IT SAW MORE CLEARLY WHAT IT WAS LIKELY TO GET IN ITS OWN AREA OF CONCERN. THE RESULT, NOT SURPRISINGLY, HAS BEEN A KIND OF STALEMATE IN WHICH REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN TACTITLY DEFERRED FOR THE DRAFTING STAGE.

3. KEY ISSUES. THE OVERRIDING ISSUE BOILS DOWN VERY SIMPLY--HOW FAR WILL MOSCOW GO IN OFFERING CONCESSIONS IN THE AREA OF FREER COMMUNICATION? NO OTHER ISSUE APPEARS LIKELY TO PROVE UNMANAGEABLY TROUBLESOME. AGREEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE ON SECURITY PRINCIPLES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES AND MUCH OF THE PRESENT FRENCH DRAFT MAY WELL EMERGE AS THE BASIS FOR FINAL AGREEMENT. THE SWISS PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INSTITUTION FOR COMPULSORY SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES SHOULD DIE A QUIET DEATH, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A FACE-SAVING MANDATE TO PURSUE THE IDEA IN THE FUTURE. THE AREA

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OF INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT COOPERATION HAS PROVEN RELATIVELY FREE OF CONTROVERSY. AGREEMENT OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBM'S) MAY PROVE QUITE TROUBLESOME--PARTICULARLY FOR US IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT OUR APPROACH IS MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN OUR ALLIES' (A SUBJECT WHICH WILL BE DEVELOPED IN ONE OF OUR SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES)--BUT NO ONE EXPECTS THE CONFERENCE TO FOUNDER ON THIS ISSUE AND AN AGREEMENT CLOSE TO THE MINIMAL POSI-

TION SHARED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE U.S. MAY WELL BE THE END RESULT. BUT THE OUTLOOK IS LESS CLEAR WITH RESPECT TO THE HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION AREA WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE THUS FAR REFUSED--FOR NEGOTIATING REASONS THAT ARE UNDERSTANDABLE--TO SHOW THEIR HAND. THEIR POSTURE HAS BEEN TO WORK FOR AN "UMBRELLA" OF PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION AGREEMENTS, PRINCIPLES OR CAVEATS WHICH THE WEST FEARS WILL ROB THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS OF VITALITY. THE SOVIETS PROMISE US IN THE CORRIDORS, HOWEVER, THAT WE WILL BE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED AT HOW FAR THEY WILL GO IN THIS AREA ONCE THEIR CONCERNS FOR AN "UMBRELLA" ARE MET, BUT WE ARE UNLIKELY TO KNOW UNTIL LATE IN THE DRAFTING STAGE WHAT THE SOVIETS FEEL ABLE TO CONCEDE. WHILE NO ONE EXPECTS RADICAL CONCESSIONS, MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL PRESS HARD FOR MODEST PROGRESS WHICH CAN JUSTIFY CSCE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PUBLIC OPINIONS.

4. FOLLOW-ON MACHINERY. A SECOND MAJOR ISSUE WILL BE THE DECISION WHETHER TO AGREE UPON INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO FOLLOW UP THE PRESENT CONFERENCE. THE NATO COUNTRIES WERE ORIGINALLY NEGATIVE ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY, CERTAINLY ABOUT ANY MECHANISM WITH POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES, AND MANY OF THEM UNDOUBTEDLY STILL ARE BUT THERE ARE NEVERTHELESS SIGNS THAT THIS POSITION IS ERODING. THE NINE'S RECENT STRATEGY PAPER ADMITS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EVENT THAT CSCE PROVIDES SUFFICIENTLY POSITIVE RESULTS, AND SCHEEL'S IDEA THAT THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE COULD BE PROVIDED A LIMITED MANDATE TO CARRY ON FOR A THREE-YEAR TRIAL PERIOD WITHOUT A SECRETARIAT DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE FALLEN ON ENTIRELY DEAF EARS AT THE EC-9 MINISTERIAL. INDEED THE NINE MAY SEE IN FOLLOW-ON MACHINERY STILL ANOTHER FORUM IN WHICH TO EXERT THEIR DEVELOPING POLITICAL SOLIDARITY. AS SOME
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OF THE NEUTRALS AND ROMANIANS ARE ALSO IN FAVOR OF SOME SUCH ARRANGEMENTS, THE PRESSURES IN THIS DIRECTION ARE LIKELY TO BECOME STRONG BEFORE WE ARE THROUGH. BUT EVEN IF POLITICAL FOLLOW-ON SHOULD BE RESISTED, WE BELIEVE THAT A WIDE RANGE OF "TECHNICAL" FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITY IS BECOMING VIRTUALLY INEVITABLE AND THAT SOME FORUM FOR THE COORDINATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES MAY BE SEEN AS A PRACTICAL NECESSITY.

5. EC-9 AS A POLITICAL FORCE. ONE OF THE BY-PRODUCTS OF CSCE, WHICH MAY WELL BE AS SIGNIFICANT AS THE SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF, HAS BEEN THE ACCELERATED EMERGENCE OF A SEPARATE POLITICAL IDENTITY FOR THE EC-9. THIS IDENTITY TOOK SHAPE AT THE M.P.T. IN HELSINKI AND HAS GROWN STEADILY IN GENEVA, GENERALLY BUT NOT ALWAYS TO THE

LARGER WESTERN BENEFIT. AFTER INITIAL OBJECTIONS, COMMON MARKET COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SPOKEN ON BEHALF OF THE NINE IN MEETINGS ON COMMERICAL MATTERS AND THE NINE REGARDED EASTERN ACQUIESCENCE IN THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE ONE REPRESENTATIVE SPEAK FOR THEM AS A GROUP AS AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT. THE NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION WEEKLY CAUCUS IS NORMALLY PRECEDED BY THE WEEKLY EC CAUCUS, AND THIS PROCEDURE IS DUPLICATED AT THE COMMITTEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE LEVELS. THE POSITIONS HAMMERED OUT BEFOREHAND IN THE EC-9 CAUCUSES ARE, OR COURSE, ASSERTED IN THE NATO CAUCUSES AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED THERE. AS THERE IS AN UNDERLYING IDENTITY OF VIEWS ABOUT THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE EC-9 AND THE OTHER SEVEN OF THE NATO GROUP, THIS TWO-TIERED APPROACH HAS WORKED WITHOUT UNDUE FRICTION. ONE EXCEPTION IS IN THE ECONOMIC AREA OF BASKET II WHERE THE NINE FEELS THE PRIMACY OF THE EC IDENTITY ESPECIALLY KEENLY, AND COORDINATION WITH THEIR NATO COLLEAGUES HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN SATISFACTORY AS A RESULT. NEVERTHELESS, FOR GOOD OR ILL, THE NINE POLITICAL COHESIVENESS HAS BECOME A STRONG FACT OF LIFE AT CSCE AND UNDOUBTEDLY HAS FORESHADOWED A TREND WHICH IS BEING AND WILL BE INCREASINGLY FELT OUTSIDE CSCE.

6. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POSITION. THE STONG NEW ROLE ASSUMED BY EC-9 HAS FIT WELL WITH OUR OWN MODEST POSTURE. WITH THE NINE TAKING THE LEAD, WE HAVE GENERALLY CONFIDENTIAL

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FOLLOWED RATHER THAN TRIED TO FORMULATE THE WESTERN CONSENSUS. THIS HAS NOT BEEN DIFFICULT AS OUR OWN NATURAL POSITIONS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS TO BE FOUND COMFORTABLY WITHIN THE PARAMETERS SET BY THE MORE AGGRESSIVE NATO PARPTICIPANTS AT THE CSCE, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE MORE CONCILIATORY, ON THE OTHER. THIS IS ALSO TRUE IN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE; AS A GENERAL RULE IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE--WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE CBM'S, AS MENTIONED ABOVE--WITH THOSE POSITIONS WHICH PROVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS AND TO OUR ALLIES.

7. CONCLUSIONS. ONE YEAR AFTER THE OPENING OF PREPARATORY TALKS IN HELSINKI, AND THREE MONTHS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF PHASE II, CSCE HAS ACQUIRED A MOMENTUM OF ITS OWN, THE SUM OF THE DIVERSE POLITICAL INVESTMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE IN IT. THIS MOMENTUM LOOKS AT THE MOMENT STRONG ENOUGH TO CARRY THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF PHASE TWO BY LATE SPRING--ALTHOUGH MORE PESSIMISTIC OPINIONS ARE STILL BEING HEARD--AND TO YIELD RESULTS WHICH ARE BOTH MODEST ENOUGH TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS AND PROMISING ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IF NOT ENTIRELY

THEIR PUBLIC OPINIONS. BUT THIS STILL DEPENDS, IT SHOULD
BE EMPHASIZED, ON AN ASSUMPTION OF SOVIET READINESS TO MAKE
SOME CONCESSIONS IN THE FIELD OF HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION
THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN PROVEN.BASSIN UNQTE KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COMMITTEE MEETINGS, AMENDMENTS, HOLIDAYS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 DEC 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE238341
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/EE:HGILMORE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731243/aaaabfgj.tel
Line Count: 227
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <06-Sep-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <08 MAR 2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: AN OVERVIEW
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE
To: BELGRADE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005